LABOUR EURO-SAFEGUARDS CAMPAIGN

BULLETIN JULY 1997

MORE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

ON THE AMSTERDAM IGC

 

1. What was actually achieved at Amsterdam?

Not much. Indeed Amsterdam was a disappointment to almost everyone - one of the most unachieving Summits in an increasingly depressing series. Europe’s leaders are out of touch with Europe’s people, who are much more concerned with unemployment than monetary union. France and Germany were openly at odds, particularly on the deflationary implications of the Single Currency. Italy, fearing exclusion, was desperate that no firm decisions should be taken on EMU. The Club Med states were anxious to block British and German proposals on enlargement. There was no agreement on voting in the enlarged community, or on whether there is to be a soft or hard Single Currency. There were warm words on unemployment, but little else, except plans for another conference in the autumn.

2. Did Britain achieve its Objectives?

The new government’s tactics, like those of John Major’s administration at the beginning of the 1990s, were to make a substantial effort to get on better terms with the other European leaders, to take as constructive a line as possible on the issues, and to avoid confrontation wherever possible. As a long succession of British leaders have discovered, however, it is not so easy. The need to reach compromises with people whose agenda is often so different from Britain’s inevitably means that the British negotiating position gets ground away. We joined the Social chapter, but defence is now moving, however slowly, within the EU ambit; enlargement, which we wanted, is stalled; and on fishing, no viable and enforceable deal was secured on quota hoppers.

 

3. Was further progress made to "ever closer union"?

Despite the failure to achieve agreement on major issues, the relentless drive towards political integration continued. In the Draft Treaty, the Union and its Court are given powers to define EU citizens’ rights to "freedom, security and justice", and to harmonise police and court procedures. More power is to go to the European Parliament. The role of the veto is to be further reduced, and qualified majority voting extended. A European foreign policy is to be developed, and the Euro Foreign Office beefed up. Member States are to be at risk of being penalised, even to the extent of having their voting rights withdrawn, for persistent non-compliance with the EU Treaties. The Schengen border arrangements, previously outside the EU Treaties, have now been incorporated within them. Fast track EU integration, which Britain had hoped to make subject to a watertight veto, may be allowed to go ahead without those not participating being able to control what is done. Groups of EU states would then be able to use EU institutions, for which we all pay, for purposes for which there is no Treaty provision, creating an inner elite, over which there would then be no real check.

 

4. What about Enlargement?

Almost no progress was make on the admission of new Member States. The Commission will publish its views on the current applications in mid-July, covering policies on agricultural, structural and social funds, and a future financial framework. Included among other thorny topics, will be a review of the British rebate. There are major disagreements on the voting system. New applicant states will have to accept all the EMU restrictions set out in the Maastricht Treaty, including compliance with the convergence criteria. There seems little chance of agreement. Germany, which wants enlargement, is distracted by its domestic difficulties over EMU. The French do not want to see the Common Agricultural Policy weakened or dismantled, as it would have to be. The Club Med states share France’s concerns, and also do not want new competitors for EU subsidies.

5. Did the French Socialist Government have a significant impact?

The newly elected French Socialist government might have made a difference, but disappointingly it did not do so. It objected to the constraints of the so-called Stability Pact, involving heavy penalties on Member States exceeding the Maastricht 3% of GDP borrowing norms, but failed to stop them being agreed. In return, the French received meaningless general assurances on unemployment, none of which modify the over-riding commitment to price stability embodied in the deflationary Maastricht convergence requirements. Britain sided with Germany in rejecting French job-creating proposals, supporting instead the hard line view that low inflation and "stability" will create millions of new jobs, despite all the evidence to the contrary, as EU unemployment climbs and climbs.

 

6. How did Britain fare on Fishing?

Britain got nowhere on fishing at Amsterdam, particularly on quota hoppers, now 26% of the British fleet. There is no support elsewhere in the EU for a protocol to stop quota hopping, so this objective was not pursued at Amsterdam. Instead, the government accepted a proposal which the Commission has been advancing for over a year, requiring a proportion of fish landings in Britain, or a proportion of crew members to be British residents. These proposals are unenforceable, as experience has shown. They also do nothing to stop quota hopping triggering yet bigger cuts in Britain’s existing fishing fleet. This is likely to happen because the rich British fishing waters attract quota hoppers from worn out fishing grounds, making the overall British fishing fleet appear to grow. Britain’s fishermen therefore receive no EU financial assistance. The quota hoppers, on the other hand, whose home fleets are notionally shrinking, receive massive EU handouts. These subsidies are then used to pay for the construction of new, high tech vessels in Spain and elsewhere, which then come to our fishing grounds, and with which our fishermen cannot compete. This really is complete madness.

7. What about Social Rights?

There is a new chapter in the Draft Treaty on harmonisation of "freedom, security and justice", focusing on "individual rights", aiming to "combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion, disability, age or sexual orientation". While these may be admirable objectives, why do they have to be enforced from Brussels? The intention of the Treaty is that their implementation will pivot on the European court of Justice in Luxembourg, opening the way for further progressive transfers of legislation and judicial proceedings to the Union, and away from national control.

 

8. Do we sign up to the Social Chapter by signing the Amsterdam Treaty?

The Maastricht Social Protocol and Agreement - incorrectly called the Chapter - is to become part of the main Treaty. A new Article 118 requires the Commission, with chosen representatives from employer and employee "partners", to make proposals on seven named topics, these being employment, labour law and conditions, social security, rights of association, and occupational health and risks. Simultaneously, the Draft Treaty states that "Such Directives shall avoid imposing administrative, financial and legal constraints in a way which would hold back the creation and development of small and medium sized undertakings." It is not clear how these often incompatible objectives are to be reconciled.

 

9. Have the Powers of the European Parliament been increased?

In the earlier Treaties, the European Parliament had powers to propose amendments and to give an opinion. Gradually these powers have been extended. Now, co-decision is to be extended to all measures other than the three articles relating to European Monetary Union. This change represents a major enhancement to the powers of the European Parliament, with a corresponding reduction in the scope and authority of national legislative bodies.

10. Has Britain retained the Veto?

The Draft Treaty extends qualified majority voting both to decisions on existing policies and eleven fresh ones proposed in the new Treaty, as well as to new initiatives in foreign and security policies. QMV can also be used to go ahead with fast track flexibility provided it does not affect the "competence, rights, obligations and interests" of any non-participant Member State. In the last resort, nevertheless, unanimity will still be required at the European Council. As all Member States have, however, already committed themselves, through the Treaties of Accession, to "ever closer union", it is not clear how effective this veto provision may turn out to be.

 

11. What has happened to the development of EU Foreign and Defence Policies?

The Commission is clearly aiming to play a greater part in EU foreign relations, and there is a new emphasis on the "consistence of external activities as a whole". The Secretary General of the Council of Ministers becomes the "High Representative of the Common Foreign and Security Policy" - in other words a Foreign Secretary General. There is also to be a Political Committee to monitor the CFSP, capable of delivering opinions to the Council on its own initiative.

On defence, the Draft Treaty refers to the "progressive framing of a common defence policy", and to "closer institutional relations with the WEU with a view to the possibility of the integration of the WEU into the Union, should the European Council so decide." Any development in defence policy, however, must not prejudice, and must be consistent with, NATO defence arrangements. Any "decision having military or defence implications" also needs unanimity.

 

12. What happens next?

A minister must sign the final legal text, probably in October this year. Formally, all that Parliament has to do is to add the name of the Treaty to the list in the European Communities Act 1972 by a simple amending Bill. As a result, debate could be limited. We therefore need a White Paper, setting down the implications of the Draft Treaty text, early printing of the full EU Treaty, as amended by Amsterdam, and an examination and Report by a House of Commons Select Committee before consideration of the Bill. The Amsterdam Treaty requires the most careful and detailed scrutiny. Despite initial appearances to the contrary, there remains a danger that much further ground could be conceded. Should this be the case, is this not the point at which the British people should be consulted through a referendum about whether they really want to endorse yet more continuing movement towards an integrated, centralised European state?

 

Published by the Labour Euro-Safeguards Campaign

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